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The appellant does not dispute the statement by the re-
spondent, Provo City Corporation, that presentation of a 
claim within the time fixed by law is a condition precedent 
to bringing an action against a town or city. The appellant 
would merely point out to the Court that Utah Code Annota-
ted, 1943, Title 15-7-76, states that, every claim against a 
city "for damages or injuries alleged to have been caused 
by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition 
of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge 
of such city or town or from the negligence of the city or 
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2 
town authorities in respect to any such street, alley, cross-
walk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge shall, within thirty days 
after the happening of such injury or damage, be presented 
to the board of commissioners or city council of such city 
* * * *. Every claim other than claims above mentioned 
against any city or town must be presented * * * within 
one year * * * ." 
It is to be noted that no objection is made to the form 
or sufficiency of the claim, but only to the matter of timely 
presentation. The appellant argues that the claim herein, 
which is the basis of this suit, is not a, suit which comes 
within the thirty days limitation clause, but one which comes 
within the yearly limitation clause. A statute which is in 
derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed. 
Where a statute specifically enumerates certain condi-
tions under which a short statute of limitations will apply, 
the rule of Inclusio Unius Est Exclusiq Alterius applies. In 
other words, the legislature, by specifying certain condi-
tions, excludes all others. Therefore, if the negligence com-
plained of is negligence as against the plaintiff directly and 
negligence in respect to a street, etc., the city cannot invoke 
the short statute of limitations. Appellant in this case does 
not contend or allege that the negligence of the city was in 
respect to any street, etc., or that the city's relationship to 
these things had anything to do with the injury, but rather 
that the city's negligent construction and maintenance of 
the coasting course was the proximate cause of the injury. 
The statute seems clear in its meaning, and is not capable 
of the interpretation that the respondent, Provo City Cor-
poration, would put upon it. 
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In 38 A~ J. 385, Sec. 676, the rule is stated as follows: 
"A provision in a statute or a municipal charter 
requiring notice or the presentment of claim as a con-
dition precedent to the maintenance of an action, there-
on, being against common right, will be strictly con-
strued. Thus, where, as is the case in many states, 
notice of an injury arising from a defective highway is 
required to be filed within a comparatively brief period 
after the injury, it has been held that such a require-
ment has no application to an action for an injury aris-
nig from the negligent management of other public 
works and not resulting from the obstruction of the 
highway as a place for travel, even if the injury actu-
ally occurred within the limits of the way. Nor does 
such requirement apply to injuries arising from con-
ditions outside the streets or highways of the munici-
pality, or even to objects or substances in the streets 
or highways which, while resulting in injuries to ad-
jacent property, do not render the street or highway 
defective as such." 
In light of the above rule, it is obvious that the princi-
pal case is not one of those which comes within the thirty 
days period provided in the statute. A rather isolated case, 
but somewhat in point is a Canadian case which says: 
"Notice is not necessary of an injury to a child, 
playing in the street from being splashed with boiling 
pitch used in repairing a wood block pavement, since 
the injury was caused not be any defect in the condi-
tion of the streetitself , or the nonrepair thereof, but 
resulted in consequence of negligence in the doing of 
repairs." Waller vs. Sarnia (1913) 4 Ont. Wee., Notes 
890, 24 Ont. Week. Rep. 204, 9 D. L. Rep. 834. 10 
A. L. R. 254. 
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In Dahl vs. Salt Lake City, 45 Utah Reports 544,. 147 
Pac. 622, the court said: 
''It will be noticed that the statute is comprehensive 
and sweeping in its terms respecting the claims that 
must be presented to the city council before an action 
can be brought and successfully maintained thereon. 
These claims are divided into two classes: One class 
consists of claims 'for damages or injury alleged to have 
been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or ob-
structed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, side-
waJk, culvert or bridge,' which must be presented' with-
in thirty days after the happening of such injury or 
damage.' The otp.er class consists of 'every claim, 
other than the claims above mentioned,' and must be 
presented, properly itemized or described, etc., within 
one year after the last item of such 'account or claim' 
accrued." 
In .conclusion, the appellant alleges that the contention 
of Provo City Corporation that the claim of the appellant 
was not filed timely is unfounded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, ·.j·,·,.· Attorney for Appellant 
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